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FEDERAL ESTATE TAX: SECTION 811(c) REVISITED
RlcuArm

B. STEP~ms

". I'll make assurance double sure,
And take a bond of fate .... .
If Congress imposes a tax upon a particular transaction, and there
are alternative transactions that may be undertaken to accomplish
approximately the same purpose, Congress must make the tax apply
to these alternatives also or suffer the tax to be avoided. With respect
to the federal estate tax Congress has chosen the former course; and,
although the statute is couched in terms of a death duty, the tax is,
in effect, imposed upon many inter vivos transfers.'
On the other hand, resort to a transaction beyond the reach of a
particular tax does not necessarily mean complete tax immunity. In
recent years non-testamentary gratuitous transfers of property have
been subject to the federal gift tax; as a result, even though different
rates, exclusions, exemptions and deductions apply, such transfers,
whether brought within the scope of the estate tax or not, are not
wholly tax-free. This obvious overlapping of the estate and gift taxes
is not, of course, a conclusive argument for removing transfers now
caught by both from the reach of one or the other. Nevertheless, as
regards many inter vivos transfers, sound reasons can certainly be
advanced for adjusting the gift tax provisions so as to impose the
desired tax burden at the time the transfer is made rather than, in
effect, postponing the final installment until years or decades later.
A consideration of estate tax provisions relating to inter vivos transfers cannot be undertaken entirely without regard to the gift tax, but
it is not the purpose of this article to consider in detail the interrelation of the two taxes or to probe the social, political or economic
reasons opposed to, or in favor of, either. On October 25, 1949, the
President signed House Bill 5268,2 which, among other things, made
certain changes in Section 811(c) of the Internal Revenue Code,3 one
*SHAKESPEAIE, MACBETH, Act IV, Scene 1.
'See Lowndes, A Day in the Supreme Court with the Federal Estate Tax, 22
VA. L. REv. 261, 267 (1935): "In order to insure the tax on testamentary and

intestate succession Congress has surrounded these taxes with a protective fringe
of taxes upon inter vivos transactions."
2Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
3
Unless otherwise stated, all section references in this article are to sections
of the Internal Revenue Code.

(33)
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of the estate tax provisions concerning inter vivos transfers. The purpose of this article is to take a backward and forward look at that
section.

4

I. CONTEMPLATION OF DEATH

Since 1916, the Federal Government has imposed a tax upon a
decedent's estate measured by the value of his interests in property
at death. 5 A person's first thought, when told of such a tax, would
be that he could prevent his estate from incurring liability by getting
rid of his interests in property before his death. Why not, when he
knows he is about to die, or sooner with the inevitable occurrence in
mind, simply give away all his property? This crude avoidance possibility was, of course, foreseen by Congress, and in its earliest form
the modern federal estate tax contained a provision requiring inclusion
in the decedent's gross estate of the value of property of which he had
6
made a gratuitous transfer during his life "in contemplation of death."
This provision has been retained in all subsequent statutes 7 and now
appears in Section 811(c) (1) (A) of the Internal Revenue Code.
The long-standing contemplation-of-death provision has not been
substantially changed recently, either as regards its statutory form or
its administrative or judicial interpretation. Although it is a part of
Section 811(c), its provisions will not be discussed in this article beyond the following brief comments.
The leading case on gifts in contemplation of death is United States
v. Wells,8 in which the Supreme Court recognized: (1) that the pro4

For a very comprehensive review of Section 811(c) and its predecessors,
written prior to the decisions in Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S.
632 (1949), and Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701 (1949), and
to the recent amendments to this section, see Eisenstein, Estate Taxes and the
Higher Learning of the Supreme Court, 3 TAx L. REV. 395 (1948).
5
Revenue Act of 1916, 39 STAT. 756 (1916). The tax is, and was, imposed
upon the "transfer of the net estate," but Section 811(c) and this article are
concerned only with what is included in the gross estate.
6
Revenue Act of 1916, §202(b), 39 STAT. 777 (1916).
7
See: Revenue Act of 1918, §402(c), 40 STAT. 1097 (1919); Revenue
Act of 1924, §802(c), 43 STAT. 304 (1924); Revenue Act of 1926, §302(c),
44 STAT. 70 (1926); Revenue Act of 1932, §803(a), 47 STAT. 279 (1932);
INT. REV. CODE §811(c), 53 STAT. 121 (1939).

8283 U. S.102 (1931).
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vision covers inter vivos gifts, ".... despite the fact that they are fully
executed, are irrevocable and indefeasible,"9 and (2) that ". . the
dominant purpose of the provision is to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions and thus to prevent the evasion of the estate
tax."' 0 The Court held that:
"It is contemplation of death, not necessarily contemplation of
imminent death to which the statute refers"' .... The words, 'in
contemplation of death' mean that the thought of death is the
impelling cause of the transfer, and while the belief in the imminence of death may afford convincing evidence, the statute
is not to be limited, and its purpose thwarted, by a rule of construction which in place of contemplation of death makes the
final criterion to be an apprehension that death is 'near at
2
hand'."'
The holding in the Wells case has been in substance incorporated into
3
the estate tax regulations.'
The words "contemplation of death" have come to have a fairly
precise meaning in the federal estate tax laws. But the application of
the phrase, depending as it does upon the dead man's motive'14 at the
time he made the gift, has been difficult.' 5 Even in 1916 Congress
recognized the difficulty, and gave the Commissioner an assist in the
form of a rebuttable presumption, as follows:' 6
9id. at 116.
lObid.
11Id. at 117.
121d. at 118.
13U. S. Treas. Beg. 105, §81.16 (1943).
14".. .the differentiating factor must be found in the transferor's motive."
United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 117 (1938).
15". . . the judge did not charge that a motive to avoid estate taxes if found
to contribute only ten per cent of the total motives actuating the transfers
would require a verdict for the defendant. On the contrary, he instructed the
jury the very last thing that it was for them to say what amounted to a
substantial motive, adding that personally he might consider $20 or $15 out
of $100 as a substantial portion or . . . even 10 per cent." Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794, 797 (C. C. A. 2nd 1938), cert. denied, 306
U. S. 648 (1939).
'6Revenue Act of 1916, §202(b), 39 STAT. 777 (1916).
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36

"Any transfer of a material part of his property in the nature of
a final disposition or distribution thereof, made by the decedent
within two years prior to his death without . . . consideration,
shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been
made in contemplation of death ...."
This provision, without change, appears in the Code today. 17 From
1926 to 1932 it was bolstered by a conclusive presumption concerning
some transfers. 18 But the conclusive presumption was declared unconstitutional in Heiner v. Donan,19 and accordingly Congress retained only the rebuttable presumption of the 1916 Act in amendments
made to the Revenue Act of 1926 by the Revenue Act of 1932.20
Difficulties of proof remain; but, as to gifts within the two-year
period, the taxpayer must do more than present some evidence in
order to overcome the contemplation-of-death presumption. 2' Estates
of decedents continue to be enlarged for federal estate tax purposes
under the contemplation-of-death provision, 22 which probably may
correctly be said to be gaining new vitality under the more friendly
handling of some of the courts of appeals. 23 Is this desirable? Would
it be better simply to tax gifts made near the time of death at estate
tax rates and let the gift tax be the only levy imposed on other un24
qualified gifts?
17

1NT. REV. CODE §811(c)(1)(A).
' 8 "Where within two years prior to his death but after the enactment of
this Act and without such a consideration the decedent has made a transfer
• . . of any of his property . . . and the value or aggregate value, at the time
of such death, of the property . . . so transferred to any one person is in
excess of $5000, then, to the extent of such excess, such transfer . . . shall be
deemed and held to have been made in contemplation of death within the
meaning of this title." Revenue Act of 1926, §302(c), 44 STAT. 70 (1926).
(Italics supplied).
1928 5 U. S. 312 (1932).
20
Revenue Act of 1932, §803(a), 47 STAT. 279 (1932).
21
"This provision was intended to and does place upon the taxpayer the
burden of proving by a fair preponderance of evidence that the transfer within
two years of death is not made in contemplation of death." Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794, 799 (C. C. A. 2nd 1938), cert. denied, 306
U. S. 648 (1939).
22
E.g., Davidson v. Commissioner, 158 F.2d 239 (C. C. A. 10th 1946);
Smails v. O'Malley, 127 F.2d 410 (C. C. A. 8th 1942).
23
See Bittker, The Church and Spiegel Cases: Section 811(c) Gets a New
Lease on Life, 58 YALE L. J. 825 (1949).
24
See G~aswoLD, C.SES AND MATEaRIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION 154, n.C
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II.

DEFERRED POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT UNDER PRIOR LAW

After 1916, at least until 1931, the estate tax provision corresponding to present Section 811(c) could properly be regarded as twopronged, gathering into the decedent's gross estate, for tax purposes,
property that had been the subject of an inter vivos gratuitous
transfer:
(1) in contemplation of his death, or
(2) intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
25
after his death.
After May v. Heiner2G and its reaffirmance by the Supreme Court in
1931,27 Congress added a third prong requiring inclusion in the gross
estate of the value of property that had been the subject of an inter
28
vivos gratuitous transfer:
(3) ".... under which decedent had retained for his life or any
period not ending before his death (1) the possession or
enjoyment of, or the income from, the property, or (2) the
right to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom .... "
29
In 1932 the third prong was amended to read as it does now.
(1946); H. R. 990, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., §204(a)(1): "Contemplation of
Death.-If the decedent within a period of three years ending with the date
of his death (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money's worth) transferred an interest in property, relinquished a
power, or exercised or released a power of appointment, such transfer, relinquishment, exercise or release shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed
to have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of subsections
(c), (d), and (f); but no such transfer, relinquishment, exercise or release
made prior to such three-year period shall be deemed or held to have been
made in contemplation of death."
25
Revenue Act of 1916, §202(b), 39 STAT. 777 (1916).
2 281 U. S. 238 (1930) (holding a transfer in trust with the income reserved
for life, after a prior life interest, not within the possession-or-enjoyment
provision).
27
Burnet v. Northern Trust Co., 283 U. S. 782 (1931); Morsman v. Burnet,
283 U. S. 783 (1931); McCormick v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 784 (1931) (applying
the May v. Heiner rule to transfers under which there was no life interest prior
to that retained by the transferor).
28
J. Res. March 3, 1931, 46 STAT. 1516 (1931).
29"... under which he has retained for his life or for any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period which does not in
fact and before his death (i) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to
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The contemplation-of-death provision of Section 811(c) has been
treated very briefly above. 30 This article is concerned primarily with
the other prong (or prongs) relating to transfers intended to take
effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. It was the
possession-or-enjoyment provision, unadorned by the 1931 and 1932
amendments, that was the subject of lively controversy in the recent
Church31 and Spiegel3 2 cases, and that has even more recently been
33
amended by Congress.
1. The Reserved Life Interest
It was suggested previously in this article that, if one were told his
estate would pay a tax measured by the value of his interests in property at his death, his first reaction would be to dispose of his property
before his death. As also suggested, this unglossed bit of potential tax
avoidance was largely nipped in the bud by the contemplation-ofdeath provision. What, then, of other efforts to avoid the tax? Would
not the next thought be to transfer away legal title to property during
life while retaining possession of it, or the enjoyment of it, until death?
It seems almost too clear for question that the simple possession-orenjoyment provision of the 1916 Act and subsequent acts was aimed
primarily at thwarting such avoidance efforts. It has always expressly
applied both to direct transfers and to transfers in trust.
Consider the simplest example of a transfer seemingly within the
provision. D without consideration conveys his personal residence to
B but reserves a life estate. Can it reasonably be argued that such a
transfer is not one intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
for B at the death of D? The early estate tax regulations called for
inclusion in D's gross estate of property so transferred; 34 and the
Supreme Court in 1927 clearly indicated its agreement with the inthe income from, the property, or (ii) the right, either alone or in conjunction
with any person, to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income therefrom." Revenue Act of 1932, §803(a), 47 STAT. 279
(1932). INT. REv. CODE §811(c)(1)(B).
30
For a detailed treatment see MONTGOMERY, FEDERAL TAXES: ESTATES,
TRusTs AND GIFTS 512 et seq. (1948); PAUL, FEDERAL. ESTATE AND GrF-r
TAXATION §§6.01 et seq. (1942).
31

Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632 (1949).
Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701 (1949).
33
Pub. L. No. 378, §7, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
34
See Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632, 639 (1949).
32
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terpretation expressed in the early regulations,3 5 by holding the
possession-or-enjoyment provision unconstitutional as applied to a
trust created prior to its passage under which the decedent settlor
had reserved the right to the trust income for life.
Nor were the Treasury and the Court without precedent for their
early and seemingly correct interpretation of the possession-orenjoyment provision. Apparently, it made its debut in the Pennsylvania
inheritance tax law of 1826.36 In 1884 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court held that whenever one transferred property but reserved for
himself for life the right to the income and profits therefrom, even
if he gave up possession, the transfer was not intended to take effect
in enjoyment until his death 3 7
There was adequate reason for surprise when the Supreme Court
handed down its almost defiantly illogical (and perhaps therefore
brief) opinion in May v. Heiner,38 holding the possession-or-enjoyment
provision inapplicable to the estate of a decedent who had retained
only a life interest in property transferred. The surprise was even
greater when, in the year following, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
39
its May v. Heiner holding.
In 1931, Congress took care of the May v. Heiner situation by an
amendment to Section 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, which
corresponds to present Section 811(c), providing that, as to transfers
made after March 3, 1931,40 the date the amendment was approved,
3

GNichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927). The possession-or-enjoyment
provision found in §402(c) of the Revenue Act of 1918, which controlled in the
Coolidge case, was expressly made applicable "whether such transfer or trust
is made or created before or after the passage of this Act .
" 40 STAT. 1097
(1919).
36
LAws oF Pssu
NSLV
1700-1849, c. 346, §1 (Dunlop), Act of April
7, 1826. This early Pennsylvania statute applied to transfers intended to take
effect, in possession or enjoyment, after the death of the grantor. When a similar
provision was written into the New York tax law of 1892, it was made applicable
to transfers intended to take effect, in possession or enjoyment, at or after the
death of the grantor. Note, 56 YALE L. J. 176 (1946).
7
3 Reish v. Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 521, 526 (1884).
38281 U. S. 288 (1930); cf. note 26 supra.
39 The news hit Congress "almost like a bombshell, because nobody ever
expected such a decision." Senator Smoot, 74 CONG. REc. 7078 (1931).
4
9There was nothing in the language of the 1931 amendment to indicate that
it applied to only those transfers made after its passage, but the Treasury adopted
that interpretation in T. D. 4314, C. B. X-1, 450 (1931). In 1938 the Supreme
Court settled the matter by holding neither the 1931 or 1932 amendments

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss1/2
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the mere retention of a life interest in property gratuitously transferred
required inclusion of such property in the transferor's gross estate.
This, then, was the state of the law when Francois Church died on
December 11, 1939. In 1924 he had transferred property in trust, irrevocably and without reserving any power concerning the trust, but
requiring the trustee to pay him the income for life. 4' The original
possession-or-enjoyment provision, viewed logically, seems clearly to
embrace this case. May v. Heiner said it did not. The 1931 and 1932
amendments covering it had been specifically held not to have any
retroactive effect. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court
finessed the troublesome notion of stare decisis, delivered May v.
Heiner the coup de grace, and taxed Church's estate on the value of
42
the property.
Justice Black regarded May v. Heiner as mortally wounded by the
earlier Hallock43 decision. There, in 1940, the Supreme Court had
scotched the tantalizing distinction sought to be drawn between the
Klein and St. Louis Trust Co. 44 situations, which rested upon the
applicable to transfers made prior to their enactment. Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S.
303 (1938). For the language of the 1932 amendment, see note 29 supra.
41
The trust instrument made no provision for distribution in the event
Church survived all his children and his brothers and sisters and their children,
but the Tax Court, the Circuit Court of Appeals affirming, rejected the Commissioner's contention that the reversionary interest arising by operation of law
justified inclusion of the value of the trust corpus in Church's gross estate under
the possession-or-enjoyment provision. Estate of Church, P-H 1944 TC ME-.
DEc. SERV. 45,134 (1944); Commissioner v. Church's Estate, 161 F.2d 11 (C. C.
A. 3rd 1947).
42
Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632 (1949). Inasmuch as
the rule expressed in May v. Heiner had no effect on transfers made after
March 3, 1931, the case was of diminishing importance and would before long
have died a natural death anyway.
4
3Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940) (holding that ridding oneself
of legal title to property prior to death does not render inapplicable the possessionor-enjoyment provision). ". . . [W]e there directly and unequivocally rejected the
only support that could possibly suffice for the holdings in May v. Heiner."
Commissioner v. Estate of Church, supra note 42, at 643.
44
1n Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231 (1931), the transfer of legal title
was conditional (the fee was to "remain vested" [id. at 2331 in the decedent)
until the decedent's death. In Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39
(1935), and Becker v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (1935), the fee had
passed from the decedent before death, though it could have revested in him
upon the happening of an expressed condition subsequent, prior to the decedent's death, i.e., the death of the beneficiary.
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notion that, if the decedent had rid himself of bare legal title to
property prior to death, such property could not be included in his
gross estate under the possession-or-enjoyment provision. In other
words, in the Hallock case the Court had said in effect that, if one
conveyed away property but expressly retained a possibility of getting
it back, regardless of whether this possibility arose out of a condition
precedent or a condition subsequent, the value of such property was
includible in his gross estate. The rational basis for May v. Heiner,
if any, was that legal title was no longer held by the decedent upon
his death, and clearly the Hallock decision weakened this possible
prop.
For a few months in 194945 lawyers and prospective decedents
could say that, according to Supreme Court interpretation of the
simple possession-or-enjoyment provision of Section 811(c), if one
transferred property before or after 193148 but after 1916,47 and retained a life interest in such property, the value of the property so
transferred was includible in his gross estate at death. 48 Even during
this brief period, however, the Treasury sought to apply a different
rule. The estate tax regulations were amended to provide that, with
respect to a decedent dying on or before January 17, 1949, 49 the
property so transferred would not be included in his gross estate if
the transfer preceded the 1931 amendment, or in other cases the 1932
amendment, which specifically nailed it.50 Thus, in keeping with
48

Between January 17, the date of the Supreme Court decision in the
Church case, and October 25, the date on which Pub. L. No. 378 became law.
4"When the precursor of Section 811(c) was amended expressly to cover
reserved life interests. See note 40 supra.
47The possession-or-enjoyment provision could not constitutionally be made
applicable to transfers made before its enactment when the decedent had retained only a life interest in the property transferred. Nichols v. Coolidge, 274
U. S. 531 (1927). But cf. Commissioner v. Chase Nat. Bank of New York, 82
F.2d 157 (1986), cert. denied, 299 U. S. 552 (1936), holding Section 302(d)
of the Revenue Act of 1926 constitutional as applied to a trust created before
its enactment, when the settlor retained power to amend the trust; U. S. Treas.
Reg. 105, §81.17, as amended by T. D. 5741, Sept. 6, 1949, making retention
of an income interest in property, retention of an interest in property within the
meaning of the regulation even if the transfer was made prior to 1916.
48Assuming he retained the interest until death. Cf. Estate of Miller, 40 B. T. A.
138 (1939). And see Section 8 of Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., providing for tax free release of certain life estates, prior to 1951.
49
The date of the Church decision.
50U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.17, as amended by T. D. 5741, Sept. 6, 1949.
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statements made in oral argument, 5 1 the Treasury refrained from full
exploitation of its hard-won victory in the Church case.
At this stage Congress again took a hand.

2. Reversionary Interests
Before considering the recent changes in 811(c), it is appropriate
to notice the other Supreme Court decision which, along with the
Church case, seems to have stirred the recent Congressional activity.
52
This is, of course, the Spiegel decision.
As previously suggested, a gratuitous transfer in contemplation of
death would compel inclusion in the transferor's gross estate of the
value of the property transferred. Similarly, a gratuitous transfer retaining the right to the income from the property transferred would
not free the transferor's estate from tax liability with respect to such
property. Still, one might inquire whether, if one gratuitously, during
life, transferred property to another for life, and specified further that
the transferee would not get the fee unless he survived the transteror,
the imposition of a tax on the estate of the transferor could thus be
avoided with respect to such property if the transferor predeceased
the transferee. At a fairly early date, in Klein v. United States,53 the
Supreme Court answered this precise question in the negative under
the possession-or-enjoyment clause.
The language of the Klein case 54 and perhaps also the decision in
May v. Heiner prompted executors to assert a distinction between the
situation just described and one set up in terms of a condition subsequent effecting an immediate transfer of legal title but saving a
reversionary interest operative upon the happening of a stated contingency. This difficult and seemingly artificial distinction was ac51
"The Government at the bar of this Court suggested that hardships could
be alleviated by a regulation relieving of a tax those estates which could show

• . . reliance [on May v. Heiner]. The very suggestion involves a confession that

the decision would be unfair." Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S.
632, 685, n.14 (1949).
52

Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701 (1949).

53283 U. S.231 (1931).
541d. at 233: "It follows that only a life estate was vested immediately. The
remainder was retained by the grantor; and whether that ever would become

vested in the grantee depended upon the condition precedent that the death of
the grantor happen before that of the grantee."
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cepted by the Supreme Court in the St. Louis Trust Co. cases. 55
The distinction was destined not to endure for long. In 1940 the

Court, in deciding Helvering v. Hallock,56 overruled the St. Louis
Trust Co. cases. This, then, was the background against which the
Spiegel case was decided on January 17, 1949.
The instrument of transfer in the Spiegel case 5 7 unlike that involved
in Church, made no provision for reservation of a life interest in the

corpus for Spiegel. It made no express provision reserving for Spiegel
a reversionary interest. Sidney Spiegel had made a gratuitous transfer
in trust in 1920, under which during his life the income was to be
divided among his three children, and at his death the corpus was
to be distributed in the same manner. If any child predeceased Spiegel,
such child's share was to go to the child's children, and if there were

none, to Spiegel's surviving children. No provision was made for distribution in case Spiegel survived all his children and grandchildren.
The Tax Court held the value of the trust corpus not includible in
Spiegel's gross estate.5 8 But the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit reversed 59 on the ground that the failure to provide for distribution of the corpus in the event Spiegel survived all his lineal
descendants created a possibility of reverter under Illinois law,6 0 which
55Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Co., 296 U. S. 39 (1935); Becker v. St. Louis
Trust Co., 296 U. S. 48 (1935). The decisions were severely criticized at the
time. See e.g., Lowndes, A Day in the Supreme Court with the Federal Estate
Tax, 22 VA. L. R-v. 261, 279 (1935): "The net effect of Klein v. United States
and the two St. Louis Trust Co. cases is that it is perfectly possible to give one's
property away but to retain an interest which is to take effect, if the donee
predeceases the donor, without incurring liability under the estate tax, provided
that sufficient respect is paid to the niceties of the art of conveyancing ....
To make the taxability of a transaction turn upon the form of words which are
used, goes beyond strict construction."
56309 U. S. 106 (1940); cf. note 43 supra.
57
The Spiegel trust instrument is set out in full as Appendix I to Mr. Justice
Burton's dissent in the Spiegel case, 335 U. S. 701, 735 (1949).
58
Estate of Spiegel, 1945 P-H TC Mar. DEc. 45,075 (1945).
9
Commissioner v. Spiegel's Estate, 159 F.2d 257 (C. C. A. 7th 1946).
6OThis determination is open to serious doubt. In his dissent in the Spiegel
case, Justice Frankfurter said: "If tax liability is to hang by a gossamer thread,
the Court ought to be sure that the thread is there." 335 U. S. 673. And Justice
Burton, also dissenting, said: "To the extent that the Commissioner relies upon
the law of Illinois to establish in this case the possibility of a reverter to the
settlor, by operation of the Illinois law, he has been 'hoist with his own petard'."
335 U. S. 726. And see Schuyler, Escape from Spiegel, 44 ILL. L. REv. 131 (1949).
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in turn required inclusion of the value of the corpus in Spiegel's gross
estate under the Hallock case.' The Supreme Court affirmed the
reversal without reviewing the holding that a possibility of reverter
62
arose under Illinois law on the facts stated.
In a sense, the Spiegel decision was not a great extension of the
63
Court's prior interpretation of the possession-or-enjoyment provision.
All the cases considered by the Supreme Court through the Hallock
case, however, in which the possession-or-enjoyment provision was
sought to be applied to transfers under which the decedent-transferor
had retained a reversionary interest, involved transfers under which
such an interest had been expressly reserved by the instrument of
transfer. It can be said that one retains a string on property transferred
as much if the law provides the string as if the transferor provides
it by express language in the instrument of transfer. And yet there
seems to be a major difference.
It will be recalled that the question is whether the Spiegel transfer
was one intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death. The majority of the Court, however, were not at all concerned
with what Spiegel actually intended in making the transfer in question. Said Mr. Justice Black: ". . . a post-death attempt to probe the
settlor's thoughts in regard to the transfer, would partially impair the
effectiveness of the 'possession or enjoyment' provision as an instrument to frustrate estate tax evasions. '64 Another way of expressing
65
that is: If Congress intended "intended" to have its usual meaning,
GIThe view of the Tax Court had been that Spiegel had retained no "'possibility of reversion," and that the value of the trust corpus could not be included
in his estate under the possession-or-enjoyment provision, despite incomplete
provision for distribution on Spiegel's death, because Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929), required that the decedent retain an interest
in the property, to make the provision applicable.
62
Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701 (1949).
63
It is to be noted that the Spiegel transfer, as viewed by the Court of Appeals,
fully met the two-fold test provided in the Hallock Regulations. U. S. Treas.
Reg. 105, §81.17 (1946).
64
Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 706 (1949).
65"To have in mind as a design or purpose; desiEgn: plan; purpose .
WEuSTETn, NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY

(2d ed. 1943). Congress could have

a transfer
used lan'uage which would make subjective intent irrelevant; e.g.,
. . . which will take effect in possession or enjoyment only at or after death.

See Justice Frankfurter's statement in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products,
Inc., 322 U. S.607, 618 (1944): "The idea which is now sought to be read
into the grant by Congress to the Administrator to define runder the Fair Labor
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then it did not arm the Commissioner with a sufficient weapon to
frustrate would-be evaders, so the Court must step in.68
One may be said to intend the reasonably foreseeable consequences
of his deliberate action. 67 On that basis, actual proof of subjective
intent becomes unnecessary in bringing many transfers within the
original possession-or-enjoyment provision. That is, if a transferor
expressly reserves a right for life to the income from transferred property, he will not be heard to say that he did not intend to deprive
the remaindermen of enjoyment of the property until his death. Or if,
in another manner yet by the express terms of the transfer instrument,
the transferees possession or enjoyment is deferred until the transferor's death, again the transferor can hardly contend that he intended
otherwise. Such an approach does no violence to the statute, but Mr.
Justice Black has deliberately read a significant word out of it.68
To say that a transfer under which a possibility of reverter arises
by operation of law is, on that basis alone, within the language "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death"
requires either: (1) emasculation of the word "intended," or (2)
resort to the amiable fiction that everyone knows the law in order to
prove intent. Neither seems justified. Under the theory adopted by
the Court, it would hardly have seemed too much to have required
a showing that Spiegel knew, or at least believed, that the effect of
Illinois law was to vest in him a possibility of reverter; this might
constitute proof that his intention was within the scope of the
Standards Act of 1938] 'the area of production' beyond the plain geographic
implications of that phrase is not so complicated nor is English speech so poor
that words were not easily available to express the idea or at least to suggest it."
And see Justice Burton, dissenting in the Spiegel case: "Section 811(c) requires
us to find the settlor's intent as a condition of the application of that Section
to this case." 835 U. S.701, 728. Section 811(c)(3) now legislatively defines
the old possession-or-enjoyment provision, now in Section 811(c)(1)(C), so
as to make subjective intent irrelevant. Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.
§7(a), Oct. 25, 1949.
66"Once more unto the breach .
" SHAxsPEApE, KIN( HENnY V, Act II,
Scene 1.

67See PnossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 40 (1941): "A person intends a result when he acts for the purpose of accomplishing it, or believes that
the result is substantially certain to follow from his act."
68".. . the taxability of a trust corpus under this provision of Section 811(c)
does not hinge on a settlor's motives, but depends on the nature and operative
effect of the trust transfer." Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701,
705 (1949).
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possession-or-enjoyment provision. But otherwise, as far as any interest he had was concerned, Spiegel simply intended to make an
"immediate and out and out" transfer of his property.
Assuming Spiegel did have a reversionary interest in the trust
corpus arising by operation of Illinois law, as decided by the Court
of Appeals, the decision in the Spiegel case could have been put upon
a different ground and the same result reached with less violence to
the statute. For example, Mr. Justice Black could have argued that a
trust transfer providing in express terms for distribution of the corpus
at the settlor's death, which the Spiegel trust instrument did, is on its
face one intended to take effect in possession at his death; 69 and
Spiegel's estate would not be heard to deny that this was what Spiegel
intended. As regards the requirement of Reinecke v. Northern Trust
Co. 70 that the decedent must have retained some interest in the property, it is difficult to find any parallel requirement that the interest
retained must have been intentionally retained. It seems that the
Court may have learned the lesson of the Northern Trust Co. case
too well and have focused too closely on the problem of what the
decedent retained, while paying insufficient heed to the question of
71
when he intended the transferees to get possession or enjoyment.
Of course, the fascinating fact about the Spiegel case is that the
value of Spiegel's reversionary interest at his death, computed actuarially, was only $4,000,72 whereas the value of the trust corpus, all
of which was included in his gross estate, was in excess of $1,000,000. 7 3
Clearly, this was an appealing situation for the application of the
maxim of de minimis non curat lex, suggested in Justice Burton's dis69
See the dictum of Black, J.: ". . . such a transfer must be . . . unaffected
by whether the grantor lives or dies." 335 U. S. 701, 705. The statement was
unwarranted unless intended to overrule Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278
U. S. 339 (1929).
70278 U. S. 339 (1929).
71If this is a blind spot, it is only a partial one, because in determining the
value to be included in the decedent's gross estate, as opposed to the question
of whether anything is to be included, the Court has consistently looked to the
value of transferees' interests affected by the interest retained by the decedent,
not the value of his interest so retained, as pointed out by Black, J., in the
Spiegel decision, 335 U. S. 701, 707 (1949). Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v.
Rothensies, 324 U. S. 108, 112 (1945); Commissioner v. Field's Estate, 324
U. S. 113, 116 (1945).
72
Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 727 (1949).

73Ibid.
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senting opinion 74 but rejected by the Court. 75 By reason of this relatively insignificant reversionary interest, the entire $1,000,000 was
taxed.
All this is past history. The tax law relating to transfers intended
to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death is today
neither what many lawyers thought it was prior to January 17, 1949,
nor what the Supreme Court said it was in the Church and Spiegel
cases, nor yet what the Treasury said it was going to be after those
decisions. Congress has revamped Section 811(C); 76 and it is important
to know what the law is now, as read in the glow-there never was
any light-of what has gone before.

III. DEmRD PossEssIoN oR

E-UoYmN

UNDa P ESEN

LAw

As amended, Section 811(c) becomes a frankly three-pronged im77
plement. The prongs are as follows:
1. 811(c) (1) (A) deals with transfers in contemplation of death.
2. 811(c)(1)(B) deals with transfers under which the transferor retains income interests.
3. 811(c) (1) (C) deals with transfers intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after death.
These three subparagraphs of Section 811(c) (1) contain nothing new;
all the language will be found, without change except as to order
of appearance, in 811(c) and its forerunners as they existed from June
7, 1932, to October 25, 1949.78
By separate provisions in the amendatory act, however, Congress
has, with some reservations, adopted the Church decision.7 9 This is
74Ibid.
751d. at 707. Cf. Pub. L. No. 378, §7; INrT. REv. CODE: §811(c) (2), as amended
Oct. 25, 1949. Under the amended section, as applied to pre-October 8, 1949,
transfers, retention of a reversionary interest, which has a value at death not in
excess of 5% of the value of the property transferred, is without estate tax
consequences.
7
GPub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., §7 (1949).
77Ibid.
78
See Revenue Act of 1926, §302(c), 44 STAT. 70 (1926), as amended by
Revenue Act of 1932, 803(a), 47 STAT. 279 (1932); INT. REV. CODE §811(c),
53 STAT. 121 (1939).
79Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., Ist Sess., §7(b), Oct. 25, 1949. These separate provisions do not purport to amend the Code but rather set out special
rules for the application of the Code section as amended.
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new. And in Section 811(c) (2) and (3) Congress has undertaken to
specify exclusively, with respect to transfers on or before, and transfers
after, October 7, 1949, what is covered by the possession-or-enjoyment
provision. This is new. Subsections (b) and (c) of Section 7 of Public
Law 378, without amending the Code, contain provisions concerning
the applicability of all amendments and provisions for waiving limitations against refund claims in some instances. Section 8 provides a
tax-free period for the release of certain life estates, reminiscent of
the oft-extended release period provided in connection with the
amendment of Section 811(f) in 1942.80 These changes are now analyzed. The contemplation-of-death provision is unaffected by the
recent amendments and will not be further discussed.
1. The Reserved Life Interest
In line with language that has appeared in the estate tax laws since
June 7, 1932,8 Section 811(c) (1) (B) requires that in determining
the value of the gross estate there shall be included the value, at the
time of decedent's death, of all property, except realty located outside
the United States, to the extent of any interest therein of which decedent has at any time made a gratuitous transfer, by trust or otherwise:

82

"... under which he has retained for his life or for any period
not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death (i) the possession
or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the property,
or (ii) the right, either alone or in conjunction with any person,
to designate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property
or the income therefrom ...."
The "at any time" is not new; but it did not mean before October
80
Section 403 of the Revenue Act of 1942, which amended INT. REv. CODE
§811(f), provided for the release of certain powers of appointment within a

fixed period. The period has been extended ten times by amendment of Section
403, most recently to permit tax-free releases until July 1, 1950. Pub. L. No.
137, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., §1, June 28, 1949.
81
See Revenue Act of 1932, §803(a), 47 STiT. 279 (1932).
82
1NT. REv. CODE §811(c)(1)(B).
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25, 1949, and does not mean now, what it appears to mean. Before
the recent amendment, the phrase had to be read in the light of
Hassett v. Welch,83 which, as previously mentioned in this article,
held all the language quoted in the preceding paragraph inapplicable
to transfers made prior to March 3, 1931, and part of that language
inapplicable to transfers made prior to June 7, 1932. After the recent
amendment, the "at any time" must be read in the light of Section
7(b) of the amendatory act.
Section 7(b) of Public Law 378 makes the amended Section 811(c)
applicable to estates of decedents dying after February 10, 1939, the
date of enactment of the Internal Revenue Code, and to transfers made
on, before or after February 26, 1926,84 the date of enactment of the
Revenue Act of 1926, except that in the case of decedents dying before
January 1, 1950, Section 811(c) (1) (B) 8 5 does not apply to transfers
made:
(1) before March 4, 1931, or
(2) after March 3, 1931, and before June 7, 1932, "..unless the
property transferred would have been includible in the decedent's gross estate by reason of the amendatory language
of the Joint Resolution of March 3, 1931."
The net effect of all this is to apply to decedents who died before
January 1, 1950, both May v. Heiner, 6 holding that mere retention
of a life interest in property transferred does not require inclusion
of the value of the property in the gross estate under the possessionor-enjoyment provision, and Hassett v. Welch,17 holding the 1931 and
1932 amendments to have no retroactive effect.
As to decedents dying on or after January 1, 1950, the decision in
the Church"" case controls; that is, May v. Heiner is overruled, with
the result that even though a transfer was made prior to the effective
dates of the amendments specifically relating to the retention of a
life interest, the value of property so transferred is includible in the
estate, presumably on the ground that the simple possession-or83303 U. S. 303 (1938).
84

There are exceptions to this, discussed infra pp. 55, 61 but not relevant here.
8SQuoted supra p. 48.
86281 U. S. 238 (1930).
87303 U. S. 303 (1938).
88335 U. S. 632 (1949).
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enjoyment provision covered such transfers. 89 The report of the Conference Committee on House Bill 5268 reads in part: 90
"For the sake of clarity, the conference amendments make applicable the amendatory language of the 1932 act to transfers
whenever made in the case of decedents dying after 1949, thus
retaining the result of the Church decision for the future."
Obviously, if the estate of a decedent dying before January 1, 1950,
but after February 10, 1939, has paid a tax based on inclusion in the
gross estate of property transferred by the decedent before March 4,
1931, with respect to which the decedent retained only a right to the
income for life, such estate is now entitled to a refund unless a claim
therefor is barred by statute or by a rule of law such as the doctrine
of res judicata. With respect to Church-like transfers, no provision
for relief is made in the case of claims so barred. Subsection (c) of
Section 7 of the amendatory act does waive refund claim limitations
arising out of "any law or rule of law (other than Sections 3760 or
3761)," and provides instead a new limitation period of ". . . one
year from the date of the enactment of this act . . . ." This date is
October 25, 1949. But the act further states that: 91
"This subsection shall not apply with respect to a transfer of
property in case the decedent retained for his life or for any
period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for
89

So held in the Church case: "We hold that this trust agreement, because
it reserved a life income in the trust property, was intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at the settlor's death ..
335
3.."
U. S. 632, 651 (1949).
90H. R. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
91bid. The Conference Report on H. R. 5268 contains the following discussion of refunds and credits: "The Conference amendments [to H. R. 5268,
which as so amended became Public Law 378] . . . provide a rule for cases in
which the refund or credit of an overpayment resulting from the enactment
of the amendments is prevented on the date of such enactment [Oct. 25, 1949],
or within one year from such date, by the operation of any law or rule of law
(including a judicial determination, but not including Section 3760 or 3761 of
the code). The refund or credit is, nevertheless, to be made or allowed if it
results from the application of the amendments to a transfer of property in
which the decedent did not retain any income interest described in Section
811(c)(1)(B), if claim therefor is filed within one year from the date of the
enactment of the bill. However, a refund or credit which is so prevented may
not be allowed if it results from the application of the amendments to a
transfer of property in which the decedent retained any such income interest."
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any period which did not in fact and before his death (1) the
possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property, or (2) the right either alone or in conjunction with any
person, to designate the persons who should possess or enjoy the
property or the income therefrom."
As regards Church's estate in particular, liability based upon
Church's transfer while retaining a life estate is irrevocably fixed by
the estate tax law. Although his estate would not be taxed under the
new law, 92 or, if it had been taxed, might be entitled to a refund, a
claim or suit therefor is barred merely because, inter alia, the estate
filed a petition with the Tax Court.93 On the other band, other estates
involving similar transfers fare better simply because of the timing
of the litigation. 94 But such seeming discrimination is probably an
almost unavoidable result of retroactive legislation. 9 5 The fact that
there may be a lack of uniformity, in a sense, between estates of
different decedents does not affect the validity of the provision. 96
Nevertheless, the singling out of Church's estate for guinea-pig treatment seems harsh. There were no decisions between May v. Heiner
and Commissioner v. Church holding an estate liable on the facts of
the Church case. And after the Church decision, on September 6,
1949, the Treasury amended its regulations9" to provide against
liability in such cases if the decedent died on or before January 17,
1949, the date of the Church decision. As previously explained, the
recent 811(c) amendments have further extended the amnesty
period.98
92
Under the amended Section 811(c), the estate would not be liable even
if it were determined that Church had retained a reversionary interest, because
such an interest was not expressly retained, as explained later in this article.
93ITr. R v. CODE §§911, 937; c. Elbert v. Johnson, 164 F.2d 421 (C. C. A.
2nd941947). And see Merrill v. United States, 152 F.2d 74 (C. C. A. 2nd 1945).
1n Commissioner v. Schroeder's Estate, 172 F.2d 864 (C. C. A. 2nd 1949),
the Second Circuit had reversed a Tax Court decision in favor of the taxpayer
by a per curiam decision on authority of Commissioner v. Estate of Church,
335 U. S.632 (1949). On Nov. 21, 1949, the Supreme Court, in a per curiam
decision vacated the Second Circuit's judgment in the Schroeder case in light of
T. D. 5741 and Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., Oct. 25, 1949.
95
Cf. Merrill v. United States, 152 F.2d 74 (C. C. A. 2nd 1945).
96See U. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8, clause 1; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41
(1900), holding that geographic uniformity is all that the Constitution requires.
97U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.17, as amended by T. D. 5741, Sept. 6, 1949.
9SPub. L. No. 378, §7(b), provides, in effect, for application of the Church
decision only to estates of decedents dying on or after Jan. 1, 1950.
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Persons who have transferred property at any time,9 9 retaining
an interest in the property for life, now retain such interests at the
peril of incurring estate tax liability by reason of inclusion of the
value of such property in their gross estates. Solely from the standpoint of interpreting the possession-or-enjoyment clause, the treatment now provided seems logical. As suggested previously in this
article,100 it cannot be denied that transfers of the type caught are
clearly transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at
or after death; and the possession-or-enjoyment provision has been
in the law since the year one of the present federal estate tax.
Congress has taken note, however, that some persons still living
may have made pre-1931 transfers of the type under discussion and
may, despite warning provisions in the Regulations until 193S,101
and despite the Hallock decision,' 0 2 have chosen not to release their
life interests because of a reliance, now recognized as misplaced, on
May v. Heiner. Any release now would, in most of these instances,
raise contemplation-of-death questions and would in any event be
subject to the gift tax. In contrast to the treatment afforded the
Church estate, Congress has eliminated this seeming unfairness.
Section 8 of Public Law 878 authorizes, at any time during 1949
and 1950,103 the tax-free assignment or release of life interests of the
99

The Conference Report on 11. R. 5268, in this connection, speaks of
transfers "whenever made," H. R. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949);
and the language of the Act is equally sweeping: "transfers made on, before, or
after February 26, 1926," Pub. L. No. 378, §7(b). But both must probably be
read in the light of Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U. S. 531 (1927), which would
limit the applicability of the provision to transfers made after the enactment of
the Revenue Act of 1916.
'oOSupra p. 38.
101Because of uncertainty concerning the possible retroactive effect of the
1931 and 1932 amendments to Section 811(c), the regulations were not amended
to conform to the May v. Heiner decision until 1938. See, e.g., U. S. Treas. Reg.
80, Art. 15, as amended by T. D. 4729, March 18, 1937, C. B. 1937-1, 284. The
decision in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U. S. 303 (1938), against retroactive application was published in Ct. D. 1317, 1938-12-9253, C. B. 1938-1, 490, but it
was not until Oct. 24, 1938, that U. S. Treas. Reg. 80, Art. 18, was amended to
provide, as have the regulations since then, against estate tax liability in cases
of pre-1931 (or 1932) transfers with income interests retained. T. D. 4868,
C. B. 1938-2, 355.
102 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940).
' 0 3 To fall within the gift tax exemption, the release must be made in 1949
or 1950, but the exemption from the estate tax contemplation-of-death pro-
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type occasioning liability in the Church case. The release is rendered
tax-free as regards the estate tax by provision that such transfer
shall ".. . not be deemed to have been made in contemplation of
death within the meaning of Chapter 3 .. ." of the Internal Revenue

Code, which is the Estate Tax chapter. It is made tax-free as regards the gift tax by provision that such a release shall "....

not be

deemed a transfer of property for the purposes of Chapter 4 of the
Internal Revenue Code...

"104

Clearly the inter vivos transfers of many persons still living must
be reviewed for the purpose of determining the desirability of taking
advantage of these tax-free release or assignment provisions. Personal considerations may, of course, outweigh the possible tax advantages. If they do not, then, even though the assignment or release
may be made at any time within 1950, and though the period may
possibly be extended, the fact that death may end the opportunity
suddenly argues against delay. 1 5
2. Other Deferments of Possession or Enjoyment'0 6
Consideration of the new rules governing transfers intended to
vision applies if the release is made at any time before 1951. Thus one frightened into a release, for example, in 1940 by the Hallock decision escapes any
contemplation-of-death contention as regards such release; and if an estate has
paid a tax based on such a release, it is entitled to a refund unless otherwise
barred.
1O4This is the Gift Tax chapter. As explained in the Conference Report on
H. R. 5268, "this privilege of tax-free assignment or relinquishment . . . is not
available where the transferor had on October 7, 1949, a power over the transferred property, and not over the income interest only, which would require
the inclusion of the property under 811(d) of the Code." H. R. EPi. No. 1412,
81st Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1949).
10 Section 6 of Public Law 878 makes provision for the tax-free release prior
to 1951 of certain powers under reciprocal trusts created prior to 1940, which
release might otherwise give rise to gift tax liability or to estate tax liability
under the contemplation-of-death provision of INT. Rv. CoDE §811(d).
1o61nasmuch as the scope of this article is limited to Section 811(c), it is
inappropriate to consider in detail the possible effect of the recent amendments
on other Code provisions. But it may at least be noted in passing that Section
811(f) contains provisions which include verbatim all the language now found
in 811(c)(1)(B) and 811(c)(1)(C). Public Law 878 does not purport to
redefine the effect of such language as it appears in 811(f), so it could be
given a meaning at variance with that legislatively directed for the 811(c)
language.
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take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the decedent's
death cannot be divorced entirely from the provision concerning
interests retained for life. The subsection just discussed, 811(c)(1)
(B), catches transfers made by a decedent under which he himself
retains possession or enjoyment of the property transferred for his
own life. But obviously the reason such transfers are drawn into the
estate tax laws is that they are intended to take effect in possession
or enjoyment at the transferor's death. The development of this
separate treatment of life-interest-retained transfers has been traced
in the preceding pages of this article.
As regards post-October 7, 1949, transfers, Section 811(c) (1) (C)
looks at the transfer, not from the standpoint of whether the transferor has retained anything, but rather from the standpoint of when
the transferee gets possession or enjoyment; and it makes no difference
whether the decedent-transferor retained any interest whatever' 0 7 in
the property transferred. Although transfers with interests retained,
and other transfers intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death, are treated separately, it is difficult to see
how any transfer caught by 811(c) (1) (B) would not also be caught
by 811(c)(1)(C), as explained by 811(c)(8), ignoring the postOctober 7th feature of 811(c)(3). Duplication of effort still prevails within the subsections of 811(c), seemingly inescapable for the
tirie being because of our heritage from May v. Heiner.
The language of Section 811(c)(1)(C) 1°8 has, of course, been in
the estate tax laws since 1916.109 But 811(c) (2) and (3) now undertake to delineate the scope of that provision. This is new. It renders
obsolete a long series of Supreme Court decisions attempting judicial
definition of the phrase. 10
07
1 So

far the Supreme Court has had to face the question of including in
the gross estate, under the possession-or-enjoyment provision, property with respect to which decedent had no interest at death, only as a matter of statutory
interpretation. In Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S. 545 (1927), it was unnecessary to
answer the question. In Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929),
the Court found lacking the "plain and compelling language to justify so incongruous a result ....
." Now the language is plain and the constitutional
question may be raised. But see Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S.497, 503 (1930).
108"(C) intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death."
109 Revenue Act of 1916, §202(b), 39 STAT. 756, 777 (1916).
110 See, e.g., Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701 (1949); Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U. S. 106 (1940); Klein v. United States, 283 U. S.
231 (1931); Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
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Transfers Prior to October 8, 1949. Section 811(c)(2) does not
purport merely to indicate in a general fashion some types of preOctober 8, 1949, transfers that fall within 811(c)(1)(C). Instead
it places certain transfers squarely within the provisions and excludes
all others. The language of 811(c) (2) is that transfers "shall not be
included ...

under paragraph (1) (C) unless ...

."111 Accordingly,

as regards pre-October 8, 1949, transfers, it is unnecessary to consider whether 811(c) (1) (C) may have some meaning broader than
that ascribed to it under 811(c)(2).
The following tests must be met if the value of property transferred prior to October 8, 1949, is to be included in the transferor's
gross estate upon his death by reason of the fact that the transfer
was intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
the transferor's death:
(1) The decedent retained a "reversionary interest" in the
property; and
(2) such interest arose out of the express terms of the instrument
of transfer, not by operation of law; 112 and
(3) the value of such interest immediately before the transferor's death exceeds five percent of the value of the property transferred."13

Note particularly the use of the conjunction. If any of the conditions
stated is not met, 811(c)(1)(C) does not apply.
Section 811(c)(2) goes on to define "reversionary interest" to
include " . . a possibility that property transferred by the decedent

(1) may return to him or his estate, or (2) may be subject to a
power of disposition by him..

."

but not to include ".... a possibility

that the income alone from such property may return to him or become subject to a power of disposition by him."114 The first of the
tests just enumerated must be read in the light of this definition.
What results from a transfer by D before October 8, 1949, in
trust, income to be paid to B for life, then to D, if living, for his life,
remainder to D's children? D has not expressly retained a reversionary
interest as defined, because his interest embraces income only.1 5
supplied.
"'Italics
112 Cf. Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701 (1949).
113Ibid.
l14 Italies supplied.
115Jt is recognized, of course, that other interests might possibly revert by
operation of law.
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Such a transfer will not cause the value of the property to be included
in D's gross estate under Section 811 (c) (1) (C).
But is it otherwise includible? The correct answer clearly seems
to be yes.
Section 811(c)(1)(B) does not expressly cover transfers under
which the transferor has retained for life only a contingent right to
the income, dependent upon the death of a prior life tenant. But
the same language has been interpreted by the Treasury to cover
such transfers. The present Regulations provide: 116
"Reservation [of the right to the income] for a 'period not
ascertainable without reference to [the transferor's] ...death'
may be illustrated by a reservation of ...a life estate following
a precedent estate for life ...."
There is little doubt that exclusion of income-reversion transfers
from 811(c)(1)(C) is merely a recognition of the fact that they
are covered by 811(c) (1) (B). Nor can a pre-October 8, 1949, transferor who has retained such an interest avail himself of the tax-free
release provisions of the recent act unless the transfer was made prior
to 1931, or in some cases 1932, as has previously been explained in
this article. 117
Little need be said of the second test, relating to express reservation of a "reversionary interest." It will be recalled that in the
Spiegel case the reversionary interest supposed to have been retained
by Spiegel was not found in the express terms of the trust instrument
but in the rule of Illinois property law that a possibility of reverter
remains in the settlor unless the trust provisions for distribution of
the corpus take into account all possible contingencies. As to preOctober 8, 1949, transfers, the amendment renders obsolete the rule
laid down in the Spiegel case.
In the third test Congress has adopted the de minimis approach
116U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.18 (1949). The May v. Heiner transfer was of

this type, and McReynolds, J., said: "The record fails clearly to disclose whether
or no Mrs. May survived her husband. Apparently she did not." 281 U. S. 238,
243 (1930). At the time, it was thought that the decision might be confined

to its facts. See GmswoLD, CAsS

AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL TAXATION

168 (2d

ed. 1946): "One wonders again why the government risked this issue on such
a set of facts."
11TSupta p. 52.
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unsuccessfully advanced by Mr. Justice Burton in the Spiegel case." 8
There is no change in the former rule that the entire value of the
interest transferred is included;"1 9 but with respect to pre-October
8 transfers, 811(c) (2) provides that nothing at all is included unless
the value of the reversionary interest at death exceeds five percent
transferred property. As suggested by the second
of the value of the
20
and third tests:'
'here the reversionary interest has a value of not more than
five percent of the value of the transferred property, or where it
arises by operation of law (regardless of its value), it will not
cause the property to be included in the decedents gross estate
12 1
to any extent."
The definitive treatment by Congress in Section 811(c)(2) of
the question of what transfers made prior to October 8, 1949,
will be considered within 811(c)(1)(C), which is the simple
possession-or-enjoyment provision, may perhaps be applauded not
only as an attempt to relieve the courts of further efforts at the
troublesome process of definition by judicial inclusion and exclusion
but also as a relaxation of the harsh rule laid down in the Spiegel
case. It seems hardly likely, however, that Congress actually intended
what it has evidently accomplished in its restatement effort. The
following possibility involving a transfer which could properly be
said to be included within the pre-October 25 language-and this
has been in the law since 1916-but which clearly seems to be excluded under Section 811(c)(2), suggests the likelihood of Congressional switch-sleeping.
Assume that before October 8, 1949, D transferred property in
trust, the income to go to M, D's mother, for his life, and upon his
death the corpus to be distributed in the same manner, that is, to
M. It will be observed that this is essentially the Spiegel transfer,
with, however, a much greater likelihood that the transferor will
survive the life-tenant remainderman. Assume further that D makes
the transfer upon the advice of counsel that, under the state law
applicable, his failure to provide for distribution in the event M
predeceases him results in a possibility of reverter to him; in other
118335 U. S. 701, 728 (1949).

matter of outstanding life interests is considered infra pp. 65, 66.
"1gThe
2
' oSupra p. 55.
121H. R. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1949).
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words, that if M predeceases him, he will get the corpus back. For
this reason D deliberately omits any express provision for reverter
but elects instead to effect this result by applicable state law.
In this case, even to the satisfaction of Justice Burton, 12 1 it could
be said that the transfer was intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment at or after the transferor's death. Yet, under the section as
amended, such a transfer if made prior to October 8, 1949-assuming,
of course, that M happens to survive D-will result in exclusion of
the value of the property from D's gross estate, because the second
test is not met. That is, in the transfer under discussion D's reversionary interest arises, if at all, by operation of law only, and not
"by the express terms of the instrument of transfer. " 123 A court would
hardly be warranted in holding that the express terms of the instrument, merely by virtue of the operation of applicable state law,
1 24
created the reversionary interest.
If the section dealt with transfers to be made in the future, the
difficulty suggested would be almost intolerable. We would be,
more than ever, back to estate taxation based upon the well-known
niceties of the art of conveyancing. Transferors might seek out
possibility-of-reverter jurisdictions in which to make transfers free
of estate tax; whereas these same transfers, if made in other jurisdictions so as to accomplish the same thing, would have onerous estate
tax consequences. The saving grace of the provision in this regard
is that it applies only to transfers made prior to the date of its
enactment.
Yet it may well be asked whether Congress really wanted to pro122 See Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 728 (1949).
123
1NT. REV. CODE §811(c)(2).
' 2 4 But see Professor Bittker's suggestion that "...
one can hardly quarrel
with the conclusion that an interest arising 'by operation of law' is no less
significant than one expressly reserved. Both 'types' of reversionary interests are
created by the words used in the trust instrument and both are legally effective
only 'by operation of law,' i.e., because a court will attach legal consequences
to the words used in the instrument and enforce the grantor's claim. Restated,
the distinction is between rights which are conferred by a court because the
grantor has used well chosen words and those which are conferred because the
grantor has combined well chosen words with judicious silence." Bittker, The

Church and Spiegel Cases: Section 811(c) Gets a New Lease on Life, 58 YALE
L. J. 825, 834 (1949). There is no quarrel with this as a matter of legalistic
theorizing. As a practical matter, however, a transferor does know what he has
written in his instrument, but he seldom knows all the law. Hence the language
requiring express terms in the instrument.
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vide amnesty for transfers made before October 8, 1949, which in
the most ordinary sense of the long-standing provision were actually,
that is, subjectively, intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death. The necessary intent could be shown by
testimony concerning the advice of counsel 125 and in other ways.
A word must be said concerning the valuation of the reversionary
interest for the purpose of determining whether such interest exceeds
in value the critical five percent of the value of the property. On
26
this score, the statute speaks as follows:1

"The value of a reversionary interest immediately before the
death of the decedent shall be determined (without regard to
the fact of the decedents death) by usual methods of valuation,
including the use of tables of mortality and actuarial principles,
pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Commissioner with
the approval of the Secretary. In determining the value of a
possibility that property may be subject to a power of disposition by the decedent, such possibility shall be valued as if it
were a possibility that such property may return to the decedent or his estate.'
If the statute, taken alone, seems to leave open difficult problems
concerning valuation of reversionary interests, such problems largely
melt away in the light of language contained in the Conference
Report indicating
the proper interpretation of the valuation
27
provision.1

125 Cf. Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Bowers, 98 F.2d 794, 797 (C. C. A.
2nd 1938), cert. denied, 806 U. S. 648 (1939): ".... the evidence demonstrated
that avoidance of estate taxes was a substantial motive for the settlor's action.

His English counsel preferred to have powers of revocation inserted in the
proposed trusts, arguing that no one could tell what would happen and he

might need to retain control of the property. Charles A. Peabody, his American
counsel, warned him that if powers of revocation were inserted in the trusts

the corpus
would not escape estate taxes."
26
INq. REv. CODE §811(c)(2).
127H. B.BP. No.1412, 81st Cong.,
1

1st Sess. 7 (1949):
"In determining whether the value of the reversionary interest exceeds

5 percent, itis to be compared with the entire value of the transferred
property, including interests which are not dependent upon survivorship of
the decedent. Thus if A transferred property in trust with the income payable
to B for B's life with remainder to X unless B predeceases A, in which
event the property shall return to A, and A dies during B's life, the value
of A's reversionary interest immediately before his death shall be compared
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It will be observed that the statute follows the supposed rule that
the reversionary interest must persist up until the time of the decedent's death 28 by providing for valuation of the interest as of that
date. This, of course, applies only to pre-October 8, 1949, transfers;
it will be seen that the question of the decedent's interest is irrelevant
under the provision applicable to later transfers.
As regards pre-October 8, 1949, transfers, the changes made in
Section 811(c) leave undisturbed the first part of the general provision in the present regulations 129 treating transfers as intended to
take effect at or after death if: "(1) possession or enjoyment of the
transferred interests can be obtained only by beneficiaries who must
...
1o The second part of the general
survive the decedent, and.
provision, however: "(2) the decedent or his estate possesses any
right or interest in the property (whether arising by the express
terms of the instrument of transfer or otherwise) "113 must be
with the entire value of the trust corpus, without deduction of the value
of B's outstanding life estate. A reversionary interest which, for example,
exists in only one-half of the corpus of a trust shall be computed as a percentage of the value of such one-half. The value is to be computed as of
the moment immediately prior to the decedent's death without regard to
whether his executor elects to have the gross estate valued as provided
under section 811(j) of the code. A possibility that the decedent may be
able to dispose of property under certain conditions shall be deemed to be
as valuable as a right to the return of the property to him under those
conditions.
"The decedent's reversionary interest is to be valued by recognized valuation principles, pursuant to regulations prescribed by the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue with the approval of the Secretary of the Treasury, and,
of course, without regard to the fact of the decedent's death. The value
shall be ascertained as though the decedent were, immediately before his
death, making a gift of the property and retaining the reversionary interest.
The rule of Robinette v. Helvering (318 U. S. 184), under which a reversionary interest not having an ascertainable value under recognized valuation principles is considered to have a value of zero, is to apply. Thus, if
a reversionary interest consisting of a right enforceable in equity to compel
a trustee to apply trust corpus for the support and maintenance of the
grantor would be considered to have a value of zero for gift tax purposes
were it being retained under a transfer by gift, it is to be similarly valued for
the purpose of the conference amendments."
128 See Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U. S. 632, 671 (1949). See
note 48 supra.
129H. R. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1949).
1s0U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.17 (1949).

131Ibid.
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changed to conform to the requirement concerning the value of the
interest retained, as opposed to "any right or interest" and to the
requirement that the interest retained must arise out of the express
terms of the instrument of transfer.
Transfers after October 7, 1949. Perhaps the forward-looking' 3 2
portion of the amendment is more important. What happens in the
case of post-October 7, 1949, transfers?
Again Section 811(c) as amended undertakes an exclusive definition of transfers included within the broad and ancient language
of what is now Section 811(c)(1)(C). The definition is found in
Section 811(c) (8), which requires inclusion in the decedents gross
estate of the value of interests transferred by him after October
7, 1949, regardless of whether the decedent retained any right or
interest in the transferred property, "if and only if":
"(A) possession or enjoyment of the property can, through
ownership of such interest, be obtained only by surviving
the decedent; or
"(B) under alternative contingencies provided by the terms of
the transfer, possession or enjoyment of the'property can
through ownership of such interest, be obtained only by
surviving the earlier to occur of (i) the decedent's death
or (ii) some other event; and such other event did not in
fact occur during the decedent's life."
It is, of course, enough if either condition is met. A limitation on
the rule expressed in (A) and (B) above is discussed later in this
article.
Of major significance is the application of Section 811(c) (3), and
therefore of 811(c)(1)(C), to post-October 7, 1949, transfers pursuant to which the decedent has retained no interest whatever in
the property he transferred. The effect of this provision is illustrated
in the Conference Report on House Bill 5268, as follows:' 3 3
182Of course, Sections 811(c) (2) and 811(c) (3) are both forward looking in
the sense that they are applicable alike to estates of decedents dying in the
future. But, as regards the date of the transfer involved, Section 811(c) (3)
relates only to transfers after October 7, 1949.
13lH. . REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1949). Congress can, of
course, define language used in a statute to mean whatever it wishes, but the
grotesque effect of the current legislative definition of the possession-or-enjoyment
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"Example (3): The decedent, after October 7, 1949, transferred property in trust to accumulate the income during his
life and at his death to distribute the principal and accumulated
income to his son or the son's estate. While the decedent has
retained no right or interest in the property, the transfer is taxable since possession or enjoyment of the property cannot be
obtained except by surviving the decedent."
In the example, the decedent had "absolutely, unequivocally, irrevocably, and without possible reservations, part[ed] with all of his
title and all of his possession and all of his enjoyment of the transferred property." 13 4 Seemingly, Congress, spurred on by the dictum
of Mr. Justice Black in the Spiegel case, an observation clearly not
warranted at the time unless intended to overrule Reinecke v. Northern
Trust Co."35 sub silentio, felt it desirable that transfers be caught by
out, and . . un811(c)(1)(C) unless ". . . immediate and out and
136
affected by whether the grantor lives or dies."
At least since the decision of the Northern Trust Co. case in 1929,
it had been generally assumed that under the possession-or-enjoyment
provision the retention of some interest by the transferor-decedent
was a sine qua non to inclusion of the value of the property in his
gross estate. Although there was never any such requirement explicit
in the provision, the requirement had been held to be there implicitly under a long-standing judicial decision. 137 Under 811(c) (3), as
a matter of statutory interpretation, there is no longer any such requirement; in fact the supposed requirement is expressly eliminated. 138 The validity of the provision as it now stands may, however,
be questioned.
provision is highlighted by the following dictum in Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S.
545, 548 (1927): ". .. [Ilt seems to us tolerably plain, that when the grantor
parts with all his interest in the property to other persons in trust, with no
thought of avoiding taxes, the fact that the income vested in the beneficiaries

was to be accumulated for them instead of being handed to them to spend,
does not make the trust one intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment
at or 4 after the grantor's death."
1 Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 705 (1949).
15278 U. S. 839 (1929).
' 3 6Estate of Spiegel v. Commissioner, 335 U. S. 701, 705 (1949). (Italics

supplied).
137Reinecke v. Northern Trust Co., 278 U. S. 339 (1929).
'SS"(whether or not the decedent retained any right or interest in the property transferred)." Ir. REv. CoDE §811(c) (3).
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If between October 7 and October 25, 1949, there were any transfers under which the transferor retained no interest in the property,
any application of the amendment to them should be forbidden as
unconstitutional. The Congress might well be said to be taxing "past
not testamentary in character and beyond
lawful transactions, ...
recall,"' 3 9 which were clearly not subject to estate tax
liability under
40
the possession-or-enjoyment provision when made.1
As regards transfers after October 25, 1949, the primary question
is whether there is an event which will support a tax on the estate
of the decedent.1 4 1 The estate tax is not simply a tax on transfers
142
from the decedent at his death. As the Court said twenty years ago:
"The question... is, not whether there has been, in the strict
sense of the word, a 'transfer' of the property by the death of
the decedent, or a receipt of it by right of succession, but
whether the death has brought into being or ripened for the
survivor, property rights of such character as to make appropriate the imposition of a tax upon that result (which Congress
may call a transfer tax, a death duty or anything else it sees
fit), to be measured, in whole or in part, by the value of such
rights."
It seems likely that legislative elimination of the Northern Trust Co.
rule causes no constitutional difficulty as regards post-enactment
43
transfers.1
' 3 9Nichols v. Coolidge, 247 U. S. 531 (1927). Cf. Untermeyer v. Anderson,
276 U. S. 440 (1928), holding the gift tax unconstitutional as sought to be applied to gifts made after the bill (which became law) had passed both Houses
of Congress and while the bill was in conference.
14 0of course, an easy escape from the issue of unconstitutionality could
readily be found by simply overruling the Northern Trust Co. case; and the
fate of May v. Heiner makes that seem not utterly improbable. Furthermore,
those wise in the ways of the present Supreme Court will hardly take seriously
a suggestion that any feature of the estate tax is likely to be held unconstitutional as applied to any situation.
14'This same question would arise as regards transfers between October 7
and October 25, 1949, if the constitutional hurdle of retroactivity were overcome
concerning such transfers.
' 42 Tyler v. United States, 281 U. S. 497, 503 (1930); cf. Porter v. Commissioners,
288 U. S. 436 (1933).
14 sThe Northern Trust Co. decision has forestalled judicial determination of
the constitutionality of applying the possession-or-enjoyment provision to transfers
under which the decedent has retained no interest in the property transferred.
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As a matter of statutory construction, certainly a transfer in trust
with provision for accumulation during the transferor's life and distribution at his death may be considered a transfer intended by him
to take effect in enjoyment at the later time.14 4 But, if such an inter
vivos transfer is absolute, unequivocal, irrevocable, and made without reservation, apart from the constitutional question, is it appropriate to tax the transferor's estate with respect thereto? 145
The language of new Section 811(c)(3)(A), quoted above, is
taken, with only a technical addition, from Regulation 105, Section
81.17.
The addition is the words "through ownership of such interest."
This new language precludes the argument that, if possession or
enjoyment might have been secured in some way not related to
the transferred interest, the possession-or-enjoyment provision should
not apply. For example:
"The decedent, after October 7, 1949, transferred property in
trust, to pay the income to his wife during her life and at her
death to pay the corpus to the decedent if living, and if not, to
his children. The decedent was survived by his wife."
The example is taken from the Conference Report on House Bill
But apparently the present Supreme Court regards this as constitutional; otherwise, why would it ask for argument on whether the Northern Trust Co. holding
should be overruled? See the Supreme Court's order for reargument in the
and Spiegel cases, JouRNAL Sup. CT. 297, 298, June 21, 1948.
Church
144 But see Shukert v. Allen, 273 U. S.545, 548 (1927).
145The transfer will be caught anyway by the gift tax, and may be caught
by the contemplation-of-death provision of the estate tax law, even if the
possession-or-enjoyment provision is not made to apply.
Consider also that neither (2) nor (3) of §811(c) as amended requires
any showing of what the decedent actually intended, in order to cause the value
of the property transferred to be included in the decedent's gross estate. In
this regard the new provisions are interestingly parallel to the situation dealt
with in Heiner v. Donan, 285 U. S.312 (1932). There a provision conclusively
presuming certain transfers made close to the date of death to have been made
in contemplation thereof without a showing as to what was in fact contemplated was held invalid. In the new provisions, transfers are deemed to be
intended to take effect at or after death without regard to what was in fact
intended. But, inasmuch as the Court has already read "intended" out of the
statute, Congress probably feels secure that the new provisions will not meet
a Heiner v. Donan fate. And see Note, 53 HsAv. L. REv. 493, 495 (1940),
referring to Heiner v. Donan as "a case the present Court may inter with few
qualms."
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5268,146 which points out that, as the children cannot possess or
enjoy the property through ownership of their remainder interest
without surviving the decedent, the transfer falls within Section
811(c)(3)(A). On the other hand, it might be possible for the
decedent to transfer his interest to the children so that they could
possess or enjoy the property on the death of the wife without surviving the decedent. Therefore, absent the phrase in question, it
might be argued that the value of the property should not be included in the decedents gross estate under the possession-or-enjoyment clause. But this would not create in the children any possibility
of obtaining possession or enjoyment, through ownership of their
interest, without surviving the decedent; therefore, under the new
provision the transfer is covered without a difficult problem of
interpretation.
The same language, "through ownership of such interest," appears
in new Section 811(c)(3)(B) for the same purpose and with the
same effect.
It should not easily be assumed, however, that the inclusion of
the phrase "through ownership of such interest" eliminates all possible
construction difficulties under the provisions hinging tax liability
upon surviving the decedent. At least in those jurisdictions in which
the beneficiaries can in some instances terminate an irrevocable
47
the question may arise whether in view of such right they
trust,'
can gain possession or enjoyment of the property through ownership
of their interests without surviving the settlor-decedent, even if the
trust instrument provides for termination on the settlor's death. Under
this particular rule of law, they could so gain possession or enjoyment; therefore the provisions imposing estate tax liability should
not, by their own terms, apply to such situations, 148 and the Commissioner might be hard pressed to find a basis for contending that
149
Congressional intent was otherwise.
To return for a moment to the example last given, involving a
trust under which the income goes to decedents wife for her life,
146H. R. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1949).
147E.g., Helvering v. Helmholz, 296 U. S. 93 (1935); Commissioner of
Corporations v. Second Nat. Bank of Boston, 308 Mass. 1, 30 N. E.2d 889 (1941).
148Cf. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U. S.188 (1938).
1491f the interest possessed by the beneficiaries were deemed a power of
appointment under Sec. 811(f) (see U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.24(b) (1949)),
the property would be expressly excluded from the decedents gross estate, as
hereinafter explained.
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it apppears that the question of outstanding life estates is still of
importance. 150 As explained in the Conference Report, it is only the
value of the property transferred 'less the outstanding life estate
in the wife" that is includible in the decedent's gross estate.
As evidenced by Regulation 105, Section 81.17, the rule expressed
in Section 811(c) (3) (A), as added by Public Law 378, is somewhat
parallel to the rule that existed prior to the recent amendment. Section 811(c)(3)(B), however, is entirely new. Under the prior law,
as interpreted by the Treasury, if possession or enjoyment could
be obtained only by surviving alternative contingencies, one of
which was the death of the decedent, the possession-or-enjoyment
provision did not apply' 5 ' because possession or enjoyment could be
obtained without surviving the decedent. Section 811(c) (3) (B) expressly covers the alternative contingency situation. Let us assume,
for example, that the decedent has transferred property in trust for
the benefit of his son, the income to be accumulated until a date
certain or until the decedent's death, and that, upon the earlier of
these to occur, the corpus is to be distributed to the son. Under the
new provisions, according to the Conference Report, the decedent's
estate would be taxed on the value of the property transferred if
the decedent dies prior to the date otherwise fixed for distribution
of the corpus.' 52 But query: If as sole beneficiary the son could, under
applicable state law, terminate the trust, can he through ownership
of his interest acquire possession or enjoyment of the property other
than upon the happening of the alternative contingencies stated?
Neither (A) nor (B) of Section 811(c) (3) requires inclusion in
the gross estate of the value of property transferred by decedent in
trust, the income to B for life, remainder to C,15 3 because, of course,
possession and enjoyment by B and C are wholly unaffected by
whether the decedent lives or dies. That B may be living at decedent's
death, so that C will not get possession or enjoyment until after that
date, is irrelevant.
Section 811(c) (3) contains a limitation on the general rule ex150 See the explanation of the Hallock case by Douglas, J., in his concurring
opinion in Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, 824 U. S. 108, 113

(1945).
15'Example (4) of U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.17 (1949).
' 5 2 See H. RI. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10, Example (5) (1949).
153 H. R. REP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess, 9, Example (1) (1949).
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pressed in subparagraphs (A) and (B). As expressed in the Conference Report:1 54
"Neither of the above rules, however, draws into the decedents
gross estate an interest in property transferred by him if possession or enjoyment of the property was obtainable during the
decedents life through the exercise of a power of appointment
as defined in section 811(f)(2) of the code and such power
was in fact exercisable immediately prior to the decedents
death."
This statement is justified by the language of the statute, which is
as follows:' 55
"Notwithstanding the foregoing sentence [which is all of 811
(c) (3) except the part here quoted], an interest so transferred
shall not be included in the decedents gross estate under paragraph (1)(C) of this subsection if possession or enjoyment of
the property could have been obtained by any beneficiary during
the decedents life through the exercise of a power of appointment (as defined in section 811(f) (2)) which in fact was exercisable immediately prior to the decedents death."
The Conference Report contains the following illustration: 156
'Example (6): The decedent, after October 7, 1949, transferred
property in trust providing for accumulation of the income during his life, and at his death to pay the entire fund to his children
or their issue. His wife was given the unrestricted power to
alter, amend, or revoke the trust. The wife survived the decedent and did not in fact exercise her power during the dece.54Ibid.
The effect of making estate tax liability under Sec. 811(c) sometimes dependent upon the meaning of "power of appointment" under Sec. 811(f)
is to heap uncertainty upon uncertainty. Sec. 811(f), as amended in 1942, is
judicially untried and, at this stage, its scope is almost a matter of conjecture.
To the extent that 811(c) depends upon 811(f) its future must remain obscure
until 811(f) takes on a clearer meaning by judicial interpretation or Congressional amendment, the latter being suggested in MoNTcomRY, Fxnr.AL TAXEs:
ESTATES TusTs Am Gnrs 616 (1948).
155INT. B~v. CoDE §811(c) (3).
156H. . RP. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1949).
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dent's life. Under the last sentence of Section 811(c)(3) the
transfer is not taxable since possession or enjoyment of the
property was obtainable during the decedent's life through the
exercise of the wife's power, which was a power of appointment as defined in section 811(f)(2) of the code, and was in
fact exercisable immediately prior to the decedent's death."
If transfers of the type described in the preceding paragraph are
to be excluded from the possession-or-enjoyment provision as interpreted by Section 811(c)(3), the limiting language quoted above
is necessary. Without it, the value of the property transferred would
be includible in the decedent's gross estate because, although the
children or their issue could gain possession or enjoyment of the
property through an exercise of the wife's power, they could not
gain possession or enjoyment through ownership of their own interest.
The requirement that the power be in fact exercisable immediately prior to the decedent's death is interesting. Mere possession
at death of a power of appointment as defined in 811(f) (2) requires
inclusion of the value of the property subject to the power in the
gross estate of the person possessing the power. 157 Thus, it was apparently the view of Congress that, even in an effort to "make assurance double sure" against avoidance of the estate tax, it was unnecessary to drag into the gross estate of the transferor the value of
property with respect to which his estate might be taxed, if the
value of the same property was simultaneously likely to affect the
estate tax liability of the estate of the person possessing the power.' 5 8
But suppose in the example last given the wife had predeceased the
husband without exercising or releasing the power. The power would
not be in fact exercisable immediately prior to the decedent's death,
because the wife has died. Nevertheless, the value of the property
subject to the power would have been included in the wife's gross
estate. Was it the intention of Congress that, in these circumstances,
the value of the property should also be included in the husband's
gross estate? It will be, under 811(c) (3) (A), because distribution
'

57

INT. REV. CODE

§811(f); U. S. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.24(b)(1) (1949).

158 In refraining from taxing the estate in the situation described, Congress
was foregoing only roughly the difference between the gift tax which would be

paid on the initial transfer and the estate tax which would result from including
the value of the property, in the gross estate, in view of the credits for gift

tax paid provided in Sections 813 and 936.
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of the trust corpus is postponed until the husband's death and the
811(f) power is not exercisable immediately prior thereto.
In short, the provision seems to go unnecessarily far in requiring
that the power be in fact exercisable immediately prior to the decedent's death. The reason, if reason there be, for exempting transfers
of property subject to Section 811(f) powers, is that the value of
the property is includible in the gross estate of the donee of the
power, and that the inclusion of such value in the donor's gross
estate is thereby rendered unnecessary. And yet, when the reason
for this exception is satisfied, as, for example, by the death of the
wife and the inclusion of the value of the property in her gross
estate, the exemption is nevertheless denied the estate of the donor. 159
Concern that the wife might, prior to the husband's death, release
or exercise the power can hardly be a reason for the requirement
that the power be exercisable at the husband's death, because in
some circumstances such exercise or release would cause the value
of the property to be included in the wife's estate,160 and in any
event the exercise or release would be subject to the gift tax.','
Even if the power were in fact exercisable at the decedents death,
the exercise or release of the power could be undertaken immediately thereafter with the same tax consequences as an exercise or
release before his death. That is, the fact that the power is in fact
exercisable at the time of the husband's death is no guarantee that
the value of the property will ultimately be included in the wife's
gross estate. It is accordingly difficult to discover a valid reason for
the requirement.
What is the tax effect of a power to appoint by will only, but
' 59It seems unlikely that the estate of the husband would be entitled to a

deduction for property previously taxed under Sec. 812(c), because the property
could not be said to have been received by the husband from the prior decedent
by "gift, bequest, devise, or inheritance."
16OhNT. REv. CODE §811(f)(1) (requiring inclusion of the value of the property in the gross estate if the exercise or release of the power is in contemplation
of death, or is made so as to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after
death).
161"The release before July 1, 1950, of a power to appoint created on or
before October 21, 1942 .. .is excepted from the application of the [gift] tax
by reason of the express provisions of section 452(c) of the Revenue Act of
1942, as amended by Public Law 187 (81st Congress), approved June 28,
1949." U. S.Treas. Reg. 108, §86.2(b). But, obviously, this exception is inapplicable to post-October 7, 1949, transfers and therefore has no bearing on
See. 811(c) (8).
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otherwise unrestricted and therefore within the definition of Section
811(f)(2)? This problem is most likely to arise under Section 811
(c) (3) (B), concerning alternate contingencies. Is there any reason
why such a testamentary power should be treated differently from
an inter vivos power? If the donee is living at decedent's death, the
power is not in fact exercisable immediately prior to that event, and
the existence of the power does not take the transfer out of Section
811(c)(3) if it is otherwise caught by that section.
An unrestricted power of appointment terminable at the death of
the donor of the power is a power of appointment within the definition in Section 811(f)(2). But immediately prior to the donor's
death such a power would in fact be exercisable. Here, then, we
find what appears to be an inter vivos transfer actually intended to
take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after death, but which
may turn out to be entirely free of estate tax consequences: Decedent,
after October 7, 1949, transfers property in trust, providing for accumulation of the income during his life and for distribution of the
entire trust fund to his children or their issue at his death. He gives
his wife the unrestricted power to alter, amend, or revoke the trust
at any time prior to his death. 162 If the wife survives the husband,
neither will incur estate tax liability. As regards the husband, the
wife's Section 811(f) (2) power, exercisable "immediately prior to"' 63
his death, insulates his estate from liability. As regards the wife, the
mere termination of her power upon the husband's death would not
give rise to tax liability. On the other hand, if the wife is first to
die, the value of the trust corpus will find its way into the gross
estates of both the husband and the wife,'6 4 unless she has exercised
her power in such a way as to preclude inclusion of the property
in the husband's gross estate. Except in the case of accidental death,
it would appear that she could so exercise her power in most cases.
1 62
This example is designed merely to show an apparent weakness in See.
811(c) (8). One peril of such a transfer, the prior death of the wife, is suggested
in the text. Beyond that, it will be observed, the transaction suggested precludes
any use of the gift or estate tax marital deductions with respect to such
property. INT. REV. CODE §§1004(a)(3)(B)(i),
1004(a)(3)(E), 812(e) (1)
(B), 812(e)(1)(F).
163 "This rule (811(c)(8)(B)], like the first
rule [811(c)(3)(A)], is to be
applied in the light of the circumstances existing immediately prior to the
decedent's death." H. R. R P. No. 1412, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1949).
164 See also note 159 supra concerning the improbability of a deduction for
property previously taxed, even though the husband's death follows within five
years of the death of the wife.
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3. Refunds
The new legislative definition of the possession-or-enjoyment provision in Section 811(c) (2) is specifically made applicable to estates
of decedents dying after February 10, 1939, and to transfers made
at any time prior to October 8, 1949. Thus, if estates of post-February
10, 1939, decedents have been taxed under the possession-or-enjoyment
provision with respect to pre-October 8, 1949, transfers, for reasons
other than retention of an income interest, 0 and if on the same
facts they would not now be taxed under 811(c) (2) and 811(c)(1)
(C), such estates are entitled to a refund. Under Section 7(c) of
Public Law 878, they may secure such a refund, even if a claim
therefor is barred by statute or by a rule of law other than a closing
or compromise agreement made under Sections 3760 and 3761, provided a claim is filed within one year from October 25, 1949, the
date of enactment of Public Law 378. But provision is made against
the payment of interest in the case of such refunds with respect to
the amount of tax paid prior to October 25, 1949.1 66
It is interesting to note that Spiegel's estate will be able to secure
a refund of the payment stubbornly resisted but finally held to be
owing. 167 Spiegel died in 1940, so the amendments apply. The transfer involved was made in 1920, so Section 811(c)(2) applies. The
value of Spiegels reversionary interest was less than five percent
of the value of the trust corpus, and the reversionary interest did not
arise by the express terms of the trust instrument, so the value of the
corpus cannot be included in Spiegel's gross estate. No compromise
or closing agreement was made; therefore, although a claim for
refund would be barred by, inter alia, the estate's petition to the
Tax Court, as in the Church case, a substitute limitation period for
refund claims gives the Spiegel estate one year from October 25,
1949, in which to file a claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
The "higher learning"'

68

offered by the Supreme Court over some

' 6 5 The possibility of securing a refund of taxes based upon Church-like transfers is discussed supra p. 51.
166Pub. L. No. 378, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., §7(b) (1949).
167 Very likely the tax has not in fact been collected, and, if so, it would be
an idle gesture to enforce the judgment and then refund the tax.
' 6 sSee Eisenstein, Estate Taxes and the Higher Learning of the Suprem
Court, 3 TAx L. REv. 895 (1948).
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two decades concerning the meaning of the possession-or-enjoyment
provision' 69 has been rendered largely obsolete by the recent legislative tinkering with Section 811(c). Although the judicial interpretation of this provision may have left much to be desired, it is
doubtful whether the legislative changes can be considered improvements. In the closing days of the first session of the Eighty-First
Congress, the Senate sought to amend a house bill simply to elimi0
nate inequities found in the recent Church and Spiegel decisions."7
In conference, the effort grew to a large-scale revision of Section
811(c). The last-minute haste of the effort is unfortunately apparent in the legislative product.
Apart from the wisdom of the legislative delineation, in Sections
811(c)(2) and 811(c)(3), of the scope of the possession-or-enjoyment provision, it seems almost that Congress has misconceived its
very function. The courts, to be sure, are theoretically limited to an
interpretation of the language which the Legislature writes into the
laws. But Congress, if it wishes to change the law, is not expected
merely to retain old language and to ascribe to it a new meaning.
The recent legislative adjudication seems more objectionable than
judicial legislation, to which we have to some extent become hardened. The amendments certainly cannot be justified on the basis of
simplification. Confusing duplication of effort continues to prevail
within the paragraphs of Section 811(c).
Moreover, if revision of Section 811(c) was or is necessary-and
it seems clear it was and is-Congress should grapple squarely with
the problem. The contemplation-of-death and possession-or-enjoyment
provisions, which have survived the full, stormy life of the modern
federal estate tax, were clearly necessary evils when adopted, because of the absence of a federal gift tax. While it can hardly be said
that they have completely outlasted their utility, careful consideration should be given to a more tidy and immediate exaction of tax
liability on inter vivos transfers now within the provisions of Section
811(c), by means of a substantial, not merely semantic, revision of
the estate tax and gift tax laws.

169"Great legal theorists off on a spree .....

Parody of The Whfffenpoof

Song, University of Florida College of Law Homecoming Skit (1949), taken out

of the context intended by the student authors.
170S.
REP. No. 831,- 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 7, 8 (1949).
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